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THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTELLECTUALS: CHOMSKY AND STUDENT
OPPOSITION TO THE VIETNAM WAR

One finds in the Vietnam War a perfect exemplar of many of the themes that trace
American history: a nation united by imperialism, colonialism, and anti-communism, and
yet divided by dissent against those very same principles; a nation forced to choose
between belief in its own ideological superiority as justification of its interventionist
policies and its belief in freedom, self-determination, and isolationism; a nation fatally
caught between arrogance and humility, competition and peace, crusades and questions.
It is unsurprising, then, that such a large-scale war, one that consumed so much of the
American population, would engender fierce support, fanaticism, and propaganda, as well
as angry defiance, opposition, calls for peace and unilateral troop withdrawal. Noam
Chomsky, as one of the first intellectuals to publicly criticize American involvement in
the war, placed himself at the forefront of the opposition movement. Yet, in the end, his
arguments served more to counter rationalizations of the opposite ideological extreme
than to catalyze and create change among the war’s opposition movement.
The war began in 1955, when Ngô Đình Diệm of Vietnam announced that elections
would not be held because South Vietnam had not accepted any agreement to do so.1 He
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For more background information on the war in Vietnam, see James E.
Westheider, The Vietnam War (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Co., 2007), Robert
Mann, A Grand Delusion (NY: Basic Books Publishing, 2002), Grace Sevy, The
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quickly took control of the South by painting communists as enemies and then rigged the
referendum on the future of Vietnam, ending with 98.2 percent of the vote; estimates had
previously predicted that the communist party would end up with about 80%. American
politicians supported this rigged election in Vietnam, although they had recommended a
more modest margin of victory.2 They feared a ‘domino’ effect of communism in Asia: if
a nation fell to the horrors of a communist government, then presumably the surrounding
nations would go through similar changes, leaving an entire region of communist threats.
The Eisenhower administration wanted a strongly anti-communist nation in the area, and
thus supported Diem because they considered him the best of the alternatives for the area.
United States involvement in the war in Vietnam began in 1963, when Diem was
overthrown by a military coup that the United States at least tacitly supported.3 South
Vietnam faced a period of extreme political instability. When Lyndon B. Johnson took
over the American presidency at the time of John F. Kennedy’s death, Vietnam was not a
priority, but, as the political situation deteriorated, he decided to expand the United
States’s military commitment. Several attacks against the USS Maddox and Turner Joy

American Experience in Vietnam (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), and
Mitchell K. Hall, The Vietnam War (NY: Pearson Longman, 2007).
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James E. Westheider, The Vietnam War (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing
Co., 2007).
3

The considerations that brought the about-face in United States foreign policy
would become a sticking point for analyses of the war. Edwin E. Moïse, in Tonkin Gulf
and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1996) pointed to the unresponsiveness of Diem to “US suggestions that he reform his
government.” Chomsky disagreed. See below in the text for his explanation.
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were reported, although the circumstances around the events left room for questions.4 The
United States Congress used these events to pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution,5 which
allowed intervention in Asia without a formal declaration of war, as long as the aim was
to help a Southeast Asian ally. In turn, Johnson used this to legally justify massive
military escalation in the affairs of Vietnam. United States troop involvement rose from
2,000 in 1961 to 16,500 in 1965. At the height of the war, after many escalating
incidents, 536,100 troops from the United States occupied Vietnam, and ultimately more
than one in ten were killed, while more than half were wounded. During that time, about
three million Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian civilians were killed; the total number
of fatalities due to the war was almost ten million people; and public outrage over the
many accounts of injustice, massacres like that of My Lai, government deception, and
other atrocities of the war began to foment in the form of various resistance movements.
Of particular interest is the opposition of the students to the war, beginning at campuses
such as that of the University of California at Berkeley and spreading across the nation.
As early as 1965, university campuses had participated in opposition to the
Vietnam War. The first “teach-in” took place on March 24, 1965, at the University of
Michigan. The teach-in was a combination of disparate elements, part protest, part
moratorium on classes, part festival, part folk singing, and, most importantly, part

4

See Edwin E. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996) for details of the attack, and
Robert J. Hanyok, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of
Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964,"Cryptologic Quarterly, 19:4 (December 2000) for the
citation of an internal National Security Agency memo stating that “there was no attack
that night [of August 4 on the USS Turner Joy].”
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See Asia Resolution, Public Law 88-408. Available at
http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/tonkin.htm.
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analysis of the Vietnam War. About three thousand students attended the first teach-in at
Michigan; about two months later, on May 21 and 22, more than thirty thousand attended
the Vietnam Day teach-in at the University of California at Berkeley. The latter protest
was not simply successful in terms of numbers: during the gathering, the Vietnam Day
Committee was born; the group, representing as it did the humble beginnings of the true
student opposition movement, organized major actions including the May 5, 1965
burning of draft cards and the International Days of Protest Against American Military
Intervention on October 15 and 16. The latter was participated in by hundreds of
thousands of anti-war protesters, including about ten thousand at Berkeley itself. Student
protests such as the ones of the Vietnam Day Committee continued through 1965 and
1966.6 And, in early 1967, more than five thousand scientists of the United States signed
a petition asking the President to stop using certain types of weapons which were said to
be inhumane.
One of the people historically acknowledged to have led the intellectual opposition
movement was Noam Chomsky, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. According to historians Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Chomsky

6

The paradigm of the student movement attracted considerable attention in
Washington. In 1970, the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest gave a name to the
pattern that had developed with the Berkeley students five years earlier: “the Berkeley
invention.” It denoted an escalating movement in which students on a small scale staged
a disruption of the university over some larger issue, which would involve the campus
police, setting up mass arrests and eventually a full-on student strike. The commission
reported that, distinctive of the Berkeley invention, “high spirits and defiance of authority
that had characterized the traditional school riot were now joined to youthful idealism
and to social objectives of the highest importance.” For more information, see Nancy
Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up: American Protest Against the War in
Vietnam 1963-1975 (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984). The student movements
were in some sense the most revolutionary and important part of the opposition against
American involvement in the Vietnam War.
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had been active in the antiwar movement since 1964, a time when none
but a very few were receptive to the notion that America’s policies
represented error, much less that they constituted a moral wrong. His
writings on the subject became a major resource and an important part of
the intellectual and moral foundation of the antiwar movement. Chomsky
[was] as scornful of doves [i.e., peace advocates] who opposed the war on
pragmatic grounds as he was of the successive Washington
administrations that led the nation into Vietnam and kept it there…
Chomsky feared that an elaborate groundwork of misinterpretation was
being laid to justify a subsequent reentry of U.S. bombing and air power in
the Vietnam theater of war. His letter to the New York Times [sic],
expressing similar opinions… evoked little response. America wanted to
forget.7
Of particular import are two claims: that Chomsky’s writings “became a major resource
and an important part of the intellectual and moral foundation of the antiwar movement,”
and that his writings were not widely accepted because “America wanted to forget.”
What follows will examine those two views more closely.
Noam Chomsky graduated from Central High School in Philadelphia to attend the
University of Pennsylvania, studying linguistics and philosophy. He earned his BA in
linguistics in 1949, his MA in 1951, and his Ph.D four years later in 1955. That same
year, he joined the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a professor of
Linguistics, where he has maintained an academic post ever since. Chomsky is noted as
an intellectual cult figure who has gained exceptional notoriety in academia for two
diverging patterns of thoughts, the first concerning an idea in linguistics called generative
grammar and the second concerning his political writings, which are situated in the
tradition of searing critiques of United States foreign policy.
In order to consider what place Chomsky held in the opposition to the Vietnam
War, especially in the student protests, one must consider in more depth the attacks that
7

Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up: American Protest Against
the War in Vietnam 1963-1975 (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984), 405.
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he laid upon social institutions such as universities and the press, to then consider
whether students made use of his work in justifying their revolts against American
foreign policy.
On February 23,1967, near the crest of American involvement in Vietnam, Noam
Chomsky authored a paper, published as a special selection from The New York Review
of Books, titled “The Responsibility of Intellectuals.”8 The essay set out Chomsky’s
views on the intelligentsia and social institutions of learning in America. He argued that
educated academics hold a special place in society because they have a duty to tell the
truth and expose lies, functioning as a sort of quality control, filter, or manipulator of
historical events, news, and major ideas. According to Chomsky, America’s intelligentsia
both was and still is subservient to the status quo of power in the United States. During
the Vietnam War, the intelligentsia primarily accepted the propaganda and doctrines of
government and other highly-regarded authorities. In fact, social scientists, members of
educational institutions, and other academics who were supposed to be the leaders of
moral fabric of the nation actually turned during the war toward providing a pseudoscientific justification for the United States’s involvements, including claims of the
imperative nature of the “defense of freedom” and the deeply held belief that the
Vietnamese, Laotians, Cambodians, etc., were inferior, inhuman. Chomsky castigated
this function of the intelligentsia, pointing out that it was also one of the reasons for the
ideological homogeneity of America’s political landscape. The people who spoke up,
according to Chomsky, were unconcerned with ideas of academic credentials or historical
standards but simply made common-sense observations about fairly clear-cut issues of
8

Noam Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” The New York Review of
Books, 8:3 (February 1967).
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right and wrong in policy. This role, he said, was played mostly by students and scientists
in opposition to the Vietnam War, rather than social scientists, historians, political
scientists, and philosophers.
Noam Chomsky criticized the “liberal press” for its commentary on Vietnam postwar, noting that while it “supported the ‘doves,’ ” it did so “[b]y stressing the ‘stupidity’
of the U.S. intervention; that’s a politically neutral term. It would have been sufficient to
find an ‘intelligent’ policy. The war was thus a tragic error in which good intentions were
transmuted into bad policies, because of a generation of incompetent and arrogant
officials. The war’s savagery is also denounced; but that too is used as a neutral category
. . . Presumably the goals were legitimate—it would have been all right to do the same
thing, but more humanely . . . .”9 Chomsky argued that the press offered a disturbingly
homogeneous ideological approach to the war: that while commentators might have
disagreed on whether the war was carried out badly or well, all disagreement took place
in the sphere of methods, rather than principles; nobody was fundamentally evil for
pursuing the war in principle, only ‘incompetent’ for not achieving certain goals. In
response to a New York Times editorial claiming that historical analysis in the future will
decide whether the war failed because it was stupid or because it was misguided,
Chomsky remarked satirically, “The sphere of Clio [the goddess of history] does not
extend to such absurd ideas as the belief that the United States has no unique right to
intervene with force in the internal affairs of others, whether such intervention is
successful or not.”10

9

Noam Chomsky, Language and Responsibility (NY: The New Press, 1977), 35.
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Ibid., 35.
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While there might be certain extremely complicated problems that require intense
training to understand, the vast majority of the important questions are the moral ones,
according to Chomsky. How do the elite justify the complexity of the problems that they
face? Chomsky pointed to what he called “pseudo-scientists.” Of author Herman Kahn,
who designated an entire vocabulary and set of terminology to just war in an attempt to
view it as a science, Chomsky said,
Of course this is all nonsense… What is remarkable is that serious people
actually pay attention to these absurdities, no doubt because of the facade
of tough-mindedness and pseudo-science. I would simply like to
emphasize that, as is no doubt obvious, the cult of the experts is both selfserving, for those who propound it, and fraudulent. … In particular, if
there is a body of theory, well-tested and verified, that applies to the
conduct of foreign affairs or the resolution of domestic or international
conflict, its existence has been kept a well-guarded secret. In the case of
Vietnam, if those who feel themselves to be experts have access to
principles or information that would justify what the American
government is doing in that unfortunate country, they have been singularly
ineffective in making this fact known. To anyone who has any familiarity
with the social and behavioral sciences…, the claim that there are certain
considerations and principles too deep for the outsider to comprehend is
simply an absurdity, unworthy of comment.11
Chomsky’s views on how and why fake scientific theories are used to justify certain
actions and policy decisions became key in his eventual claim that public debate over the
issue was fundamentally skewed, an issue that he would eventually take on through the
medium of his writings.
Chomsky later developed a more substantial support for his view that the
intelligentsia bear much of the responsibility for the Vietnam War in a book titled

11

Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals” 3.
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American Power and the New Mandarins.12 It set out the argument that the aim of United
States policy in Vietnam was actually to destroy nationalist movements like that of South
Vietnam (which the United States had originally supported), rather than to defend the
South Vietnamese people from the aggression of the North and to uphold the ideals of
anti-communism. This, he said, was actually accomplished fairly well, but it had to be
placed at the expense of the ostensible goal of the time, to protect the South. Chomsky’s
critique found its logical conclusion with the idea that American motives could not
include the protection of South Vietnam’s own interests; rather, the only imaginable goal
of the United States’ government must have been to crush the nationalist movements of
South Vietnam, whatever their form. He criticized the view of Ithiel Pool for “rul[ing] out
of consideration… a large range of viable political settlements,” most significantly any
that would imply “the inclusion of the Viet Cong in a coalition government or even the
persistence of the Viet Cong as a legal organization in South Vietnam…[however,] the
Viet Cong is too strong to be simply beaten or suppressed.”13 Pool’s view was that even a
nationalistic movement that might deserve its own right of autonomy could not be just if
Americans did not like its principles. Chomsky argued that the Viet Cong could very well
be a legal representative of the South Vietnamese people, not simply because it was “too
strong to be simply beaten” as Pool suggested. Moreover, the fact that the United States
was so stubborn in its refusal to recognize rights for the Viet Cong meant that the States
must have had an ulterior motive for doing so, and this Chomsky took to be the
destruction of South Vietnamese nationalism.

12

Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (NY: The New
Press, 1969).
13
Ibid., 49.
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The tenor of student opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War
crescendoed from 1967 onward. Two main events demonstrate different paradigms of
landmarks in opposition to the Vietnam War after the beginning of 1967. The first
occurred on March 12, 1967, when a three-page advertisement appeared in the New York
Times, consisting of signatures from 6,766 teachers and professors across the country.
This constituted the first main marshaling of American intellectual force against the war.
The second began on May 3, 1970 and brought the deaths of four unarmed students at
Kent State University in Ohio, shot by police. In response, on May 8, students across the
country shut down colleges and universities in what was called the National Student
Strike of 1970, marching on the nearest military offices and leaving about thirty of the
offices completely destroyed. But first, in order to understand the contrast between
student opposition before 1967 and opposition after it, the primary example of early (pre1967) student opposition to the war will be considered.
The Vietnam Day Committee occupies an interesting place in the history of
opposition to the Vietnam War. Chronologically prior to most of the largest and most
recognized landmarks of the movement, the committee marked the beginning of a rolling
stone of anger and fear that gathered far more moss than its organizers could have
imagined, sparking draft card burnings, nationwide protests, and organized student
oppositions. But what reasoning lay underneath the committee’s protests? The Vietnam
Day Committee gave a straightforward account of the reasons for protesting against the
Vietnam War. In preparation for the October 15 and 16, 1965 International Days of
Protest Against American Military Intervention, the committee released a statement
detailing its plans to its own organizational partners and to any interested layperson:
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The United States government is stepping up its actions against the
Vietnamese people. Every day now U. S. planes drop 100 or more tons of
bombs on the South Vietnamese peasant villages and countryside. North
Vietnamese constructions are daily bombed, from hospitals to
hydroelectric plants. In the U. S. attacks on the peace movement are
becoming sharper and sharper as the war intensifies. We must not be
silenced in the face of these attacks. A massive international protest on
October 15 and 16 thus becomes all the more vital as a step in building a
movement against American intervention in Vietnam.14
Fascinatingly, this was the only justification of protest that the entire statement gave.
More importantly, there was no argument about justified or unjustified war, weapons that
were humane or inhumane, violations of sovereignty or just self-determination, or
anything of the sort. The claim was simply that people were dying, innocent people, and
that it had to stop. One is tempted to dismiss this statement as that of a naïve, peaceful
group that had little understanding of the realities of war. That would be a mistake. The
statement lacks, undeniably, the sophisticated justification of later arguments against the
war. Yet it is fascinating exactly for that reason: righteousness pervades the statement so
deeply that only the smallest of moments is spared to justify or explain the group’s own
actions, signifying essentially that the group’s members were utterly convinced that they
were in the right. In other words, without justification or argument, without complicated
theories of pseudo-science and press manipulation, the deeply held intuition taking root
in the student movement said that the Vietnam War had to be opposed on grounds of
justice. Anything else would be inconceivable.
Teachers and scholars began to unite across the country in opposition to the war in
Vietnam during the years of 1967-1969. On March 12, 1967, the New York Times
published a three-page advertisement consisting of a statement and signatures from 6,766
14

Statement through the University of California Libraries’ Calisphere, available
at http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/kt3h4n99mj/?&query=, accessed 16 February 2011.
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teachers and professors across the country. The New York Times’s Douglas Robinson
wrote,
A large group of teachers and educators across the country appealed
yesterday for an end to the Vietnam war and accused the Government [sic]
of withholding information about the conflict from the American people…
The statement contends that the Vietnam war continues ‘because vital
facts about its origin and development have been deliberately glossed
over, distorted and withheld from the American people.’ It asks the
American people to join in urging that the Government [sic] take the
following step…[a]dopt the ‘realistic’ position that the National Liberation
Front is the representative of a ‘substantial portion’ of the South
Vietnamese people… [there are] more than 7,500 [American youth]
already dead protecting a corrupt military dictatorship against the wishes
of the Vietnamese people… The statement continues, ‘…And as teachers,
we feel a particular responsibility to the youth and children of our
nation—and of all nations.’15
This anomalous advertisement’s claim of “withh[eld] information” was unsurprising,
considering the repeated exposure of falsehoods that would later culminate in the leaked
Pentagon Papers and other journalistic expositions. More unexpected are two of the other
claims made by the alliance of teachers. One is that the insurgent National Liberation
Front, the Viet Cong, “is the representative of a ‘substantial portion’ of the South
Vietnamese people.”16 As Chomsky pointed out, most Americans at the time were
unwilling to recognize questions about the legitimacy of the war in principle. Many were
reluctant to believe that United States foreign policy, rather than being simply a failure of
correct practice given the ideology of justice, had actually been dictated by a completely

15

Douglas Robinson, “An Appeal to End Vietnam War Is Signed by 6,766
Educators,” New York Times, 31:6,297 (March 12, 1967).
16

The teachers’ point here does not come directly from Chomsky, as his
expanded theory on Southern Vietnamese nationalism was not published until several
years later. Rather, the widened debate sphere created by Chomsky’s article allowed for
the point to be made.

Krane 13
different and contrary ideology to stated policies of protecting South Vietnam. Yet the
teachers of the advertisement, riding on the back of Chomsky’s “The Responsibility of
Intellectuals,” acknowledged that to do as the United States had been doing, backing the
South Vietnamese government against the North Vietnam and the Vietcong, supported
injustice, because the Vietcong were a legitimate representative of the general will of
South Vietnam, representation being a principle of legitimation that Americans take to be
of the highest importance.17 The other remarkable claim was that “as teachers, we feel a
particular responsibility to the youth and children of our nation—and of all nations.” It is
no coincidence that the statement ended with a claim about intellectual responsibility
transcending nations and boundaries, patriotism and economic self-interest. Yet, as one
may reasonably point out, this advertisement of 6, 766 teachers was published only
seventeen days after Chomsky’s “The Responsibility of Intellectuals.” Speaking purely in
terms of chronology, it seems impossible to suggest that Chomsky’s essay catalyzed this
outpouring of intellectual opposition to the war in Vietnam. Moreover, as the analysis of
the Vietnam Day Committee statement demonstrated, much of the fervor and
righteousness in the intellectual opposition to the Vietnam War existed well before
Chomsky’s essay was published. The more appropriate understanding is that Chomsky

17

It is worth noting that the teachers did not clearly ascribe a particular motive
(i.e., mistaken justice or self-interested attempts to destroy nationalism) to the
government, though the language used to describe the actions of the government
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sphere debate over the war, framed in terms of pragmatism and success, not questioning
the justice of the actions or intent of the government, and (2) the radical interpretation of
the debate, exemplified by Chomsky, framed exactly in terms of right and wrong, not
only of the actions but more importantly of the motives of governmental policymakers, to
whom Chomsky in American Power and the New Mandarins explicitly ascribed the
motive to destroy South Vietnamese nationalist movements, an unjust goal.
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did not create this particular marshalling of force but rather helped shape its justification,
its language, its logic and the frames of its debate. His essay did not cause more than six
thousand teachers to sign a petition in two weeks. But it did affect the way that the people
took the signatures and added a petition and a statement of ideas. A wider framework of
debate, and a language of responsibility in academia and teaching: these were the true
manifestations of the impact of “The Responsibility of Intellectuals.”18
Two years later, a very different kind of protest swept college campuses across the
nation. It began with the April 30, 1970 announcement by President Richard Nixon that
America was set to begin invading Cambodia. The given reasoning was that the North
Vietnamese military received supplies through Cambodia, which it then transmitted to
troops on the offensive in the South.19 At Kent State, students burned down the ROTC
building in protest. But the real trouble came almost a week later. On May 3, as Kent
State announced its participation in the nationwide protests over the decision to invade,
police forced students into their rooms for the night. The next day, students began to
gather in protest, both against their treatment the previous night and also against the

18

While not strictly a protest or event, the Committee of Concerned Asian
Scholars in 1969 released a statement with similar language, saying, “We first came
together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the
complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of
Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political
posture of their profession.” The full founding resolution may be found at
http://criticalasianstudies.org/about-us/bcas-founding-statement.html. Again, note the
reference to responsibility versus complicity in aggression that dominates the tone of this
statement. It seems that such language was not at all an isolated event, which further
supports the idea of how the Chomskyian theory of responsibility infiltrated standards of
proper social science work.
19

President Nixon’s incursion address, available at
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President’s news. The National Guardsman who had been posted to the school carried
tear gas and M-1 rifles in the loaded position as they prepared for confrontation. Tear gas
canisters were fired on the students, and when some did not explode, students responded
by throwing them back at the Guardsmen. Students taunted the Guardsmen, attempting to
throw rocks and other objects at the guards, who were mostly out of arm-range. At some
point, gunfire erupted, and sixty-one bullets were fired. Four Kent State University
students were killed, and nine more were wounded.20 The United States university system
ground to a halt. More than half of the colleges in the country staged some sort of
protest, and all in all more than four million students participated. Hundreds of colleges
canceled class; more than fifty did not reopen that semester.
Because the reaction to the Kent State ‘massacre’ was so swift and severe, there is
little writing of justification for the protests; sheer outrage, far stronger than words,
dominated the political atmosphere. The most oft-cited memorial of the shootings is not
any piece of writing or spoken account but rather a photograph, taken by John Filo, of
fourteen-year-old Mary Ann Vecchio kneeling over the body of Jeffrey Miller after he
was shot in the mouth. The photograph won a Pulitzer Prize and came to represent the
civil war that accompanied United States involvement in Vietnam. A study by the Urban
Institute pointed to the Kent State massacre as the single factor leading to the strike
across the nation’s college campuses, the largest student protest in United States

20

For an account of the event, see Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who
Spoke Up: American Protest Against the War in Vietnam 1963-1975 (NY: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1984).
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history.21 The outrage that precipitated the nationwide college shutdown was not rational
or in need of justification in the philosophical, moral, or argumentative sense. It was
complete reactionary anger, something that no essay in the world could either have
created or destroyed once it existed. That is, the protests following the Kent State
massacre represented a fundamentally different type of opposition from the paradigm of
the signature-supported petition like the New York Times advertisement. They were nondeliberative, and because of that, required no framework, language, or clarifying reasons.
Because Noam Chomsky’s political work often contains strong criticisms of foreign
policy far outside the scope of normal objections to government practices (he is a selfdescribed anarchist), he is, more so than perhaps any other figure in United States history,
a public intellectual, one whose political accomplishments have been aimed at widening
the scope of a private, academic dispute over politics into the public sphere for anyone
with common sense and logic to critique. Public reaction to Noam Chomsky’s political
work has been correspondingly ambivalent. Some have claimed him to be a desperate
manipulator of political evidence. As Kate Windschuttle from the New Criterion wrote,
Chomsky was well aware of the degree of violence that communist
regimes had routinely directed at the people of their own countries. At the
1967 New York forum he acknowledged both 'the mass slaughter of
landlords in China' and 'the slaughter of landlords in North Vietnam' that
had taken place once the communists came to power. His main objective,
however, was to provide a rationalization for this violence, especially that
of the National Liberation Front then trying to take control of South
Vietnam.22

21

As referenced in Alan Canfora, Historical Impact of Kent State and the
National Student Strike—May, 1970 (accessed 16 February 2011); available from
http://alancanfora.com/?q=node/8; Internet.
22
Kate Windschuttle, “The Hypocrisy of Noam Chomsky,” The New Criterion,
21:9 (May 2003).
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Windschuttle claimed that the National Liberation Front could never be considered a
legitimate representative of the South Vietnam people, considering its penchant for
violence. On the other hand, Chomsky is often seen as an intellectual hero, voted the
greatest living intellectual figure by the magazine Prospect, and ranking seventh in the
New Statesman’s “Heroes of Our Time” poll. Anthony Flint of The Boston Globe framed
the debate as follows:
Ask this intellectual radical why he is shunned by the mainstream, and
he'll say that established powers have never been able to handle his brand
of dissent… It was not surprising that Chomsky's radical critique met with
indignant resistance. For every convert, it seemed, there was at least one
nonbeliever who saw him as a lunatic leftist, a brewer of conspiracy
theories, an annoyance, a one-note tune. He went from huddling with
newspaper editors and bouncing ideas off them to being virtually
banned… [F]or the most part, mainstream outlets shunned him. In the
intellectual circles of Cambridge and beyond, many of the left-leaning
thinkers who would seem to be his natural allies also turned away. A chief
complaint seemed to be his tireless promotion of an omni-applicable
analysis.23
The key observation by Flint is that Chomsky wins “converts” and “nonbelievers” in
equal measure; while the reason for this is still up for debate, within the context of
opposition to the Vietnam War it supports the point that Chomsky was, ultimately, not
inflaming the passions of the masses of students, causing them to rise up against the
injustices of the system. He simply was not that persuasive, and it is not clear that any
intellectual, public or otherwise, has the ability to manipulate public action purely
through rational argumentation.24 Indeed, Chomsky’s role in the opposition movement
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There are, of course, obvious examples of speakers who were able to combine
rational argumentation with fiery eloquence to create something extraordinary that far
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seems, ironically, to have played a counterweight to the role of pseudoscientific racism
and imperialism in the support of the war: that is, it provided an ideological justification
rather than acting as an ideological catalyst. Sometimes, that justification proved useful
in framing the debate, as Chomsky’s “The Responsibility of Intellectuals” and American
Power and the New Mandarins helped shape the intuitions of intellectual movements like
the Vietnam Day Committee, the mass of signatures in the New York Times
advertisement, into reasoned argumentation. This parallels exactly the way that social
scientists shaped and rationalized support of the Vietnam War through claims of freedom
and anti-communism in the other side of debate. In other situations, that sort of
justification proved to be unnecessary on both sides, as the Kent State-inspired protests
were argumentless and emotional, needing no intellectual framework, just as were
reactions to the attacks on the USS Maddox and Turner Joy by the government of the
United States. Perhaps Chomsky could have been more effective, more “mainstream,” if
he changed his approach to intellectualism, tried to passionately rally his radical side of
the debate instead of relying on mountains of facts and rational argumentation to make
his point. In the end though, Noam Chomsky seems to be happy occupying the space that
he does, acting as a balance against many of the extreme right-wing claims of politics,
neither winning nor losing the debate but simply allowing the debate to continue as it
must.

transcended the limits of pure intellectualism (contemporary Martin Luther King, Jr.
comes to mind). But, in the end, that does not seem to have been Chomsky’s goal.

